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Abstract 
Media coverage of humanitarian crises is widely believed to influence charitable giving, yet this 
assertion has received little empirical scrutiny.  Using Internet donations after the 2004 tsunami 
as a case study, we show that media coverage of disasters has a dramatic impact on donations to 
relief agencies, with an additional minute of nightly news coverage increasing donations by 
0.036 standard deviations from the mean, or 13.2% of the average daily donation for the typical 
relief agency.  Similarly, an additional 700-word story in the New York Times or Wall Street 
Journal raises donations by 18.2% of the daily average. These results are robust to controls for 
the timing of news coverage and tax considerations.  We repeat the analysis using instrumental 
variables to account for endogeneity bias, and the estimates are unchanged.  However, we also 
find that the effect of news coverage varies considerably by relief agency. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Early research into the economics of private giving to charitable organizations classifies the 
primary motivation for giving as either fostering the provision of public goods or increasing 
one’s private consumption.  The “public goods” model is exemplified by donors who give based 
on the anticipated return in some form of public good (Warr 1982; Roberts 1984; Bergstrom et al. 
1986); examples from the literature range from public parks that the donor may frequent to 
medical research that may benefit the donor at some future time.  By contrast, the “private 
consumption” model arises when donors derive utility from the act of giving, either because the 
well-being of others enters their own utility functions directly or because the public approval 
associated with giving benefits the donor (Arrow 1972; Steinberg 1987).  For example, 
conspicuous donations may signal wealth, thereby enabling donors to interact with individuals in 
higher socioeconomic strata (Glazer and Konrad 1996).  However, individuals may receive a 
“warm glow” from making charitable contributions (Andreoni 1989, 1990) even when their 
donations displace those of other donors, when there are no direct social benefits to donors, and 
when the beneficiaries of charitable giving are far away. 
Rose-Ackerman (1982, 1996) posits that some individuals derive utility from charitable 
programs only if they “buy in,” i.e., if they personally donate.  Complementary research in this 
area suggests that the utility gains from making charitable donations depend critically on the 
behavior of other donors.  For example, Duncan (2004) proposes that some donors may engage 
in “impact philanthropy” in which individuals make charitable gifts only if their contributions 
represent a large proportion of the total received by a charitable organization.  At the other 
extreme, Sugden (1984) suggests that individuals have a distaste for freeriding, and hence donate 
to charitable organizations if others in their peer group have also donated.  In this “commitment” 
model, individuals also believe that they should donate at least as much as members of the 
reference group. 
Regardless of whether motivated by public goods or private consumption, the majority of 
American households contribute to charitable causes.  In 2000, for example, 69% of U.S. 
households made charitable donations, with the average contributing household donating $1,942 
(Steinberg and Wilhelm 2003).  Moreover, both the beneficiaries of charitable giving and the 
level of donations are influenced by world events, as evidenced by the $2.4 billion in donations 
made to the victims of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, by the $1.6 billion raised by U.S.   3
charities for disaster relief after the 26 December 2004 tsunami, and by the $3.3 billion in cash 
raised by U.S. charities for disaster relief after Hurricane Katrina.  These striking examples of 
generosity coincided with highly-concentrated media coverage in the weeks following the 
disasters, suggesting a kind of “CNN effect” for charitable giving (Robinson 2002).   
Certainly, relief workers have witnessed the link between media coverage and donations 
that are used to fund daily operations.  For example, private donations to relief agencies during 
the early stages of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 had been sufficient to support approximately 
one million displaced Rwandans, but after the tribulations of O.J. Simpson and Tanya Harding 
eclipsed Rwanda in international news, funding for relief activities began to decline.  The 
perception among many aid workers in the camps for Rwandan refugees (including one of the 
authors) was that the public had turned its back on the crises, with potentially dire 
consequences.
1 
Yet while anecdotal evidence abounds, few studies have systematically assessed the 
relationship between media coverage and the behavior of private donors, and those that do suffer 
from important analytical shortcomings.  For example, an analysis undertaken by the Institute for 
Philanthropy finds that 14 of 15 surveyed British philanthropists believe that the media has the 
power to encourage private giving, with 11 of the 15 being inspired by the media to make 
charitable donations themselves (Breeze 2005).  Similarly, Olsen, Cartenson, and Høyen (2003) 
find a high correlation between the total number of relevant articles in western newspapers and 
the total amount of humanitarian assistance allocated to victims of the flooding in Mozambique 
in 2000 and the cyclone in eastern India in 1999.  Unfortunately, neither sample is large enough 
to make generalizations, nor is there any attempt to quantify the magnitude of the causal 
relationship.   
This study thus assesses the effect of media coverage on donations to relief agencies in 
the aftermath of the 26 December 2004 tsunami, an ideal case study because relief agencies 
concentrated their efforts on tsunami victims for several months, suggesting that donations to 
relief agencies were in fact donations to tsunami relief.  Specifically, we consider the effects of 
reports on three U.S. nightly network news broadcasts and articles in two prominent newspapers 
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newspapers.  A large headline shouted, “O.J. SIMPSON LIMITED TO TEN VISITORS A DAY.”  Below, in much 
smaller print, the text read, “In other news: ‘500,000 Rwandan slaughtered.  Another half million fighting for lives 
in refugee camps.’”     4
on private donations to eight U.S. relief agencies.  To minimize recall error and to eliminate the 
time lag between when news reports are seen or read and when donations are received by relief 
agencies, we focus exclusively on donations made via the Internet, which accounted for roughly 
half of the total value of donations to tsunami relief made by individuals (El Nasser 2005).  In 
the empirical analysis, we control for donor fatigue, tax incentives, and agency-specific effects to 
better isolate the effect of media coverage.  Finally, to alleviate concerns of omitted variable bias 
associated with other forms of reporting and fund-raising and concerns of simultaneity associated 
with news coverage of the charitable response, we use media coverage of the Iraq war and 
casualties among U.S. military personnel to instrument for media coverage of the tsunami.   
  We find that an additional minute of network television news coverage increases a given 
day’s donations by 0.036 standard deviations from the mean, or 13.2% for the average agency.  
One additional story in the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal increases a given day’s 
donations by 0.050 standard deviations from the mean, or 18.2% for the average agency.  Results 
are similar using instrumental variables, underscoring the robustness of the estimates.  
Additionally, the marginal effect of media coverage differs considerably by agency, with some 
agencies seeing donations rise dramatically with additional media coverage, while others see 
donations hold steady or even decline.  Finally, we find considerable evidence for declining 
donations associated with donor fatigue as well as evidence for the effectiveness of tax 
incentives in increasing donations.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides details about the 
tsunami disaster and the media coverage that ensued; Section III describes the data and variables 
used; Section IV describes the empirical specification and identification; Section V provides the 
results of this study; and Section VI concludes. 
 
 
II. THE TSUNAMI, THE MEDIA, AND CHARITABLE GIVING  
This 26 December 2004 Sumatra-Andaman earthquake off the northwest coast of Sumatra 
triggered a devastating tsunami that spread across the Indian Ocean, inundating coastal 
communities and claiming victims in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, Somalia, Myanmar, 
the Maldives, Malaysia, Tanzania, Seychelles, Bangladesh, South Africa, Yemen, and Kenya.  
According to UN Statistics, 229,866 people were either killed or listed as missing (UN Office of   5
the Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery 2005), rendering the tsunami one of the deadliest 
natural disasters in modern history. 
With Congress in recess and many firms operating on reduced staffs, the tsunami had 
little competition in the U.S. news during the last week of 2004.  Moreover, empirical evidence 
reveals that media outlets allocate disproportionately more attention to unanticipated crises than 
to ongoing troubles, particularly when such crises are easily explained from a scientific, social, 
or political perspective (Wynter 2005).  Finally, a number of westerners were killed in the deluge, 
potentially raising demand for media coverage (CARMA International 2005).  Thus, the tsunami 
disaster encouraged an unprecedented media response.  For example, CNN deployed over 80 
anchors, correspondents, and producers to provide 24-hour coverage of relief efforts.  Similarly, 
the tsunami dominated the front page of the New York Times, garnering over half of the articles 
on the front page in the week following the disaster, and Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World 
Report, The Economist, and numerous other news magazines featured the tsunami and recovery 
efforts in multiple cover stories.  Indeed, the tsunami dominated worldwide media attention well 
into January, 2005, much longer than any natural disaster in modern history (Wynter 2005).   
Private donations to relief agencies were equally unprecedented.  For example, Catholic 
Relief Services reported that it raised more than $1 million in under three days, a record for the 
group (Slavin 2004).  While Save the Children USA typically receives several hundred thousand 
dollars in the month following a disaster, the agency received $6 million in donations in the first 
four days following the tsunami (Strom 2005).  Lutheran World Relief raised more money in one 
week than it typically does in one year (Cooperman and Salmon 2005).  Indeed, an Associated 
Press poll revealed that 30% of American households had donated to the relief efforts within two 
weeks of the disaster (El Nasser 2005).  All told, U.S. charities received approximately $1.6 
billion in private donations for the purposes of tsunami relief (Wallace and Wilhelm 2006). 
At least five phenomena may have encouraged this high level of giving.  First, the crisis 
fell at a time of year when many Americans celebrate holidays that emphasize compassion and 
giving, perhaps fostering the “warm glow” associated with charitable giving (Falk 2004).  
Second, the beaches of Southeast Asia are familiar to American tourists who have visited in 
increasing numbers in recent decades (Hall and Page 2000).  Third, tax incentives have been 
shown to motivate charitable giving (e.g., Clotfelter 1985; Kingma 1989; Slemrod 1989; Auten, 
Sieg, and Clotfelter 2002; Green and McClelland 2002), including giving to international relief   6
and development organizations (Ribar and Wilhelm 1995).  Tax considerations may have been 
especially important in charitable contributions after the tsunami because the disaster occurred 
just five days before the traditional December 31 deadline for 2004 tax deductions and because 
the Tsunami Disaster Aid Tax Relief Act extended the deadline for charitable contributions for 
tsunami relief until January 31.  Fourth, technology facilitated giving, with approximately half of 
all donations made online (El Nasser 2005).  For example, Internet sites such as Google and 
Amazon.com added links to charities on their own websites, the latter raising $2.5 million for the 
Red Cross in 24 hours (Slavin 2004).  Finally, extraordinary treatment of the disaster by the 
media may have prompted extraordinary donations by Americans, particularly in the context of 
Rose-Ackerman’s (1982, 1996) “buy in” model of giving coupled with Sugden’s (1986) 
“commitment” model, whereby individuals donate because they feel compelled to help and 
because their friends and colleagues have also donated. 
Whatever the underlying motivation, trends in donations closely tracked trends in media 
coverage of the tsunami, suggesting that the media strongly influenced private giving to relief 
agencies.  Media coverage reached a crescendo on 30 December and donations to relief agencies 
peaked one day later (Figure 1).  A second peak in media coverage occurred on 4 January (nine 
days after the tsunami) following two minor aftershocks and Secretary of State Colin Powell’s 
visit to the affected region (Figure 2
2); donations remained high through this period, and both 
media coverage and donations fell slowly thereafter.  A second spike in donations occurred on 31 
January (36 days after the tsunami), when 2004 tax deductions for donations to tsunami 
donations expired.  Subsequent peaks in media coverage included 1 February (when President 
Bill Clinton was named special envoy to South Asia and the custody battle over “Baby 81” 
began), 19 February (when Presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton toured affected countries), 
24 February (when photographs of the tsunami taken by Canadian vacationers who subsequently 
drowned were released
3), 8 March (when Clinton and Bush briefed President George W. Bush on 
the disaster), and 26 March (the three month anniversary of the tsunami, when the media 
spotlighted recovery and reconstruction).  Media coverage peaked a final time on 28 March, 
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3 CAMRA International (2005) notes that the comparatively small number of western victims of the tsunami 
received a disproportionate share of media attention   7
when a magnitude 8.7 earthquake occurred close to the epicenter of the December 2004 
Sumatra-Andaman earthquake. 
 
III. DATA AND VARIABLES 
In analyzing the relationship between media coverage of the 2004 tsunami and donations 
to relief agencies, this study employs daily donations made via each agency’s web site.  Focusing 
on online giving minimizes the lag between when a donor observes a news item and when his or 
her donation is recorded by the recipient agency.  Equally importantly, computerized records 
eliminate concerns of recall error.  Finally, online donations accounted for approximately half of 
all donations for tsunami relief (El Nasser 2005), suggesting that they are a very good indicator 
of donations to relief agencies more generally.   
Three dozen U.S. charities that provided relief to tsunami victims were asked to share 
their daily receipts from Internet sources for the purpose of this research.  Eight agreed to 
participate in this study, including Catholic Relief Services, CARE USA, Mercy Corps, SurfAid 
International, and four others who asked to remain anonymous.  Five of the eight relief agencies 
included in the study are among the nation’s largest nonprofit groups by private funding (Hall, 
Kerkman, and Moore 2005).  Two are among the ten largest charitable organizations and three 
have religious affiliations.  All eight organizations receive donations from across the United 
States.  
Summary statistics for donations during the 100 days following the tsunami are presented 
in Table 1.  The mean value of daily donations during the study period was $72,583.  The value 
of donations varies considerably by agency, however, reflected by the standard deviation of 
$265,802; the smallest organization (Agency 1) averaged $172 per day in donations while the 
largest (Agency 8) averaged $175,339.  Four agencies received over $100,000 on average each 
day, but only three of the agencies received donations every day during this period.  One agency 
received gifts in excess of $3,000,000 on 31 December 2004.  
Most agencies recorded donations each day between 26 December 2004 and 5 April 2005.  
However, Agencies 4 and 8 do not report Internet donations made on weekends.  Agency 7 was 
not equipped to receive web donations until 21 January, reducing the number of observations to 
71 for that agency.  Finally, Agency 5 is missing three days of observations because Internet   8
donations overwhelmed their system, crashing their server.  We thus record 714 observations for 
donations over the study period. 
Media coverage is first measured by the number of minutes of tsunami-related reporting 
on each of the three largest evening news broadcasts.  According to the Pew Center for the 
People and the Press (2004), 34% of Americans regularly watch the nightly news on one of the 
three major broadcast networks, making the nightly news among the most common sources for 
information.  The mean number of minutes of tsunami coverage per broadcast of ABC World 
News Tonight, the CBS Evening News, and NBC Nightly News during the study period are 1.88, 
1.52, and 2.23 minutes, respectively, representing a significant proportion of the 18.5 minute 
broadcasts (which typically also include between eight and nine minutes of commercials).  The 
standard deviations of these broadcasts are 4.02, 3.17, and 4.11 minutes, respectively, indicating 
that coverage varies considerably over the study period.  Tsunami coverage within each 
broadcast is similar for all three programs, with simple correlations of between 0.66 (ABC and 
CBS) and 0.83 (CBS and NBC).  ABC allocated its entire broadcast to the tsunami on 2 January.  
For CBS, coverage peaked at 12.7 minutes on January 1.  For NBC, coverage peaked at 14.8 
minutes on January 8.  On each of these days, more than half the program was devoted to 
tsunami coverage.  Both ABC and CBS occasionally preempted nightly news broadcasts for 
sports events, but NBC aired its program every day. 
Media coverage is also measured by tsunami-related articles published in major 
newspapers, of which 42% of Americans report being regular readers (Pew Center for the People 
and the Press 2004).  Specifically, we consider the word counts of articles appearing in the New 
York Times and the Wall Street Journal, two of the largest U.S. newspapers by both circulation 
and subscription (Newspaper Association of America 2006).  Word counts in articles pertaining 
to the tsunami closely mirror time allocated to the tsunami in nightly news broadcasts (Figure 3).   
The New York Times averaged 1,792 words in articles pertaining to the tsunami during 
the study period, approximately 2.6 articles of average length.  The Wall Street Journal averaged 
2,342 words per day, or 3.3 articles of average length.  Word counts of tsunami coverage in the 
New York Times are highly correlated with those in the Wall Street Journal, with a simple 
correlation of 0.82, suggesting that the papers were similarly focused on the disaster during this 
period.  However, the New York Times is published daily while the Wall Street Journal is not   9
published on weekends or holidays, and as such, there are fewer observations for the Wall Street 
Journal than for the New York Times. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND IDENTIFICATION 
This paper assesses the causal effect of daily media coverage of the 2004 tsunami on 
donations to eight U.S.-based relief agencies.  Because Internet donations are made and recorded 
on the same date, using this measure precisely captures the time of giving.  If, instead, total 
donations from all sources were included, it is impossible to discern the timing of the gift and 
hence the impact of media coverage on donations.   
Giving typically peaks immediately following a major disaster and recedes gradually 
over the weeks that follow (Wynter 2005).  This phenomenon is known as “donor fatigue,” a 
state in which donors have already exhausted their resources or in which they grow complacent 
about appeals for charitable gifts, leading to a diminished public response.  The gradual decline 
in donations is seen clearly in Figure 2.  Tax incentives may also affect daily donations 
independent of media coverage (Clotfelter 1985; Kingma 1989; Slemrod 1989; Auten, Sieg, and 
Clotfelter 2002; Green and McClelland 2002) as evidenced by the two spikes in charitable giving 
on 31 December 2004 and 31 January 2005 (Figures 1 and 2). 
As noted above, the eight agencies represent the broad spectrum of non-profit 
organizations offering assistance to tsunami victims, and their daily receipts vary considerably.  
To account for this variation and to make comparisons across agencies possible, we calculate z-
scores for each agency’s collections on each day; the z-score is defined as the number of 
standard deviations from the mean across the period of study. 
Furthermore, five of the eight agencies included in the study received no donations on at 
least one day during the study period.  Indeed, 118 of the observed 714 daily Internet donations 
for a given relief agency are zero, suggesting the existence of a corner solution response.  
Because of censoring at zero, ordinary least squares is an inconsistent estimator.  To circumvent 
this problem, the causal effect of media coverage on donations is estimated via a tobit model: 
  ) + β + β , 0 max( = , 2 , 1 , t i t i t t i u MEDIA DON X    (1) 
where DONi,t is Internet donations received by agency i on day t.  MEDIAt is the media coverage 
of the tsunami and recovery efforts on day t, measured either as nightly news reporting on the 
three largest networks or as word counts in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal.  X   10
is a vector that includes the log number of days since the tsunami to account for donor fatigue, a 
dummy for 31 January 2004 to account for tax incentives associated with charitable 
contributions for tsunami relief, and a series of dummies for each relief agency.  The error term 
is assumed to follow a normal distribution such that  ) , 0 ( ~
2 σ N u . 
  Measurement error, simultaneity, and omitted variables each potentially bias the 
estimated effect of media coverage on donations.  However, measurement error in media 
coverage is unlikely as the electronic databases maintain precise figures on the timing of news 
broadcasts and the word counts of newspaper articles.  Any measurement error that does exist is 
unlikely to be systematic, leading simply to attenuation bias.  Simultaneity bias may be more 
problematic, however.  For example, approximately 2.1% of the tsunami-related articles 
published in the Wall Street Journal and 1.4% of those published in the New York Times focused 
on the magnitude and form of the response by private donors, suggesting reverse causality in a 
small number of cases.   
Omitted variable bias is also potentially problematic.  First, other media coverage of the 
tsunami is likely to influence giving; such coverage may include articles in other newspapers and 
news broadcasts on other networks, special reports, television talk shows, news magazines and 
other periodicals, Internet news, and radio news.  Second, several of the relief agencies included 
in this study solicited donations for tsunami victims via advertising and direct mail campaigns.  
Third, the efforts of some relief agencies were noted in the media, often including instructions 
for donating (see, for example, Strom 2004).  Each of these may result in increased Internet 
donations, leading to upward-biased estimates of the estimated effect of television and 
newspaper coverage.   
Fortunately, biases induced by measurement error, simultaneity, and omitted variables 
may be addressed using instrumental variables in a tobit framework.  Appropriate instrumental 
variables are exogenous determinants of daily media coverage of the tsunami that do not 
correlate with the error term in Equation 1.  Dramatic news has been shown to crowd out 
reporting on disasters (Eldridge 2005), so developments in the Iraq war may influence media 
coverage of the tsunami.  Two different instrumental variables are thus separately employed in 
this analysis – media coverage of the Iraq war and the number of casualties among U.S. military 
personnel each day in Iraq.  Both are plausibly exogenous to donations to relief agencies as none 
of the eight agencies worked in Iraq during the period of study.  Daily media coverage of the Iraq   11
war is measured by total word counts in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal for 
newspaper coverage and by minutes on the three nightly news broadcasts for television coverage.  
Information on U.S. military casualties in Iraq is based on U.S. Department of Defense statistics.   
A final endogeneity concern arises if the eight relief agencies included in the study are 
not representative of agencies involved in tsunami relief more generally.  If compiling daily 
records of Internet donations is costly, for example, then the eight agencies that provided data are 
likely to be either large enough to dedicate staff time to data collection or to be efficient enough 
that data collection is not costly.  Given that the eight agencies differ by size, focus, religious 
affiliation, and other characteristics and that virtually all relief agencies track Internet giving 
electronically, we find either possibility unlikely.  In addition, virtually all of the agencies that 
worked in the affected areas accepted online donations and all eight organizations fall under the 
purview of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.  Still, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that the eight agencies included in the study are not fully 
representative of all relief agencies.   
 
V. RESULTS 
Table 2 describes the effect of nightly news coverage of the December 2004 tsunami by the 
major broadcast networks on private donations to eight relief agencies in the 100 days 
immediately following the tsunami using tobit estimation.  The tobit model accounts for the 118 
observations in which daily donations are censored at 0.  The dependent variable is the z-score of 
donations to facilitate comparisons across agencies; coefficients are thus interpreted in terms of 
standard deviations from the mean donation of $72,583.3 during the study period.  Columns 2 
through 4 show the effect of additional time allocated to coverage of the disaster on ABC World 
News Tonight, the CBS Evening News, and NBC Nightly News, respectively, in minutes.  Column 
1 aggregates the three broadcasts into a total number of minutes.  Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are reported. 
Both media coverage and the response of individual donors to relief agencies decay as 
days, weeks, and months pass, as the images become less shocking, and as individual givers 
experience donor fatigue.  To account for these nonlinear time trends, the log number of days 
since the tsunami struck is included as an additional regressor.  In each of the four specifications, 
the point estimate is negative and significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level.    12
Total donations to the eight agencies on the tenth day after the tsunami are predicted to fall by 
0.037 standard deviations from the mean (13.5%) from those received on the ninth day,
4 while 
donations on the fiftieth day are predicted to fall by 0.008 standard deviations (2.9%) from those 
received on the forty-ninth day.  The extended tax deadline also produced a dramatic – if very 
short – spike in donations (Figure 2).  Results show that donations rose by approximately 0.60 
standard deviations from the mean (219.7%) during the last day of January 2005, an effect that is 
significant at the 1% level.  Agency 1 received fewer donations via the Internet than any of the 
other relief agencies included in the study.  Although Agency 8 is smaller than many of the other 
agencies, it receives a high share of its private donations via the Internet, a fact that is reflected in 
the large coefficient on that dummy variable.  Agencies 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 receive significantly 
larger Internet donations than Agency 1. 
One additional minute of total news coverage increases donations by 0.036 standard 
deviations from the mean, raising the average daily private donation by 12.8%, significant at the 
1% level.  An additional minute of relevant coverage on ABC World News Tonight increases 
donations by 0.084 standard deviations, or 30.8%.  An additional minute of coverage on the CBS 
Evening News or NBC Nightly News increases donations by 0.060 standard deviations (22.0%) 
and by 0.065 standard deviations (23.8%), respectively.  All of these estimated coefficients are 
larger than those for total nightly news coverage, although this reflects the very high correlation 
of minutes allocated to tsunami coverage among the three largest networks. 
Table 3 shows the effect of daily newspaper coverage of the 2004 tsunami on private 
donations to relief agencies, also using tobit analysis.  Columns 2 and 3 report the effect of 
additional articles in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, respectively, measured in 
100-word units.  The smaller sample size for Wall Street Journal articles reflects the fact that this 
newspaper is not published on weekends or holidays.  The total number of words in tsunami-
related stories from the two sources is added together in Column 1.   
Increasing relevant coverage by 100 words in the New York Times raises donations to 
relief agencies by 0.010 standard deviations from the mean, or 3.5%.  An additional 100 words in 
the Wall Street Journal raise donations by 0.140 standard deviations, or 5.0%.  As with 
television news coverage, the estimated effect of total word counts is smaller than that of either 
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the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal alone, reflecting the fact that coverage among 
print media are highly correlated.  One hundred additional total words increase donations to 
relief agencies by 0.007 standard deviations from the mean, or 2.6%.  An additional story of 700 
words, an average among major daily newspaper, raises donations by 18.2%.  These results are 
all significant at the 1% level.  In addition, the effects of passing time and the tax extension are 
very similar to the estimated coefficients calculated when assessing the impact of television 
coverage. 
While the above results are robust across specifications, endogeneity concerns remain.  
As noted in Section IV, both simultaneity and omitted variable bias may be problematic.  For 
example, approximately 2% of the articles related to the tsunami published by the newspapers 
under consideration focused on the response by private donors, suggesting the existence of 
reverse causality.  In terms of omitted variable bias, other media coverage of the disaster 
(including cable television news, additional newspapers, Internet news coverage, and other 
media) may also influence donations.  Similarly, some relief agencies purchased advertising 
and/or undertook direct mail campaigns during this period, while others were mentioned in the 
media specifically for their assistance to tsunami victims.  Each of these occurrences may result 
in increased Internet donations, leading to upward-biased estimates of our measures of media 
coverage.  Fortunately, these problems may be addressed using instrumental variables estimation.  
Two different instrumental variables are separately employed in this analysis – daily 
media coverage of the Iraq war and the daily number of casualties among U.S. military personnel 
in Iraq in the 100 days following the tsunami disaster.  These instruments are strong predictors of 
daily television news coverage of the tsunami disaster as indicated by the first stage tobit results 
presented in Table 4.  They are also plausibly exogenous to tsunami-related donations.  
Regressing total time dedicated to the tsunami on time dedicated to the Iraq war while 
controlling for all of the other regressors in Equation 1 yields a robust z-statistic of 19.10 
(Column 1), easily meeting the criteria for strong instrumental variables (Bound, Jaeger, and 
Baker 1995; Murray 2005; Stock and Yogo 2005).  The number of casualties among U.S. 
military personnel is also strong (albeit considerably weaker than the previous instrument), with 
a robust z-statistic of 6.12 (Column 2).  Finally, although both media coverage of the Iraq war 
and the number of U.S. military casualties in Iraq influence newspaper coverage of the tsunami 
disaster, neither is sufficiently strong in the first stage to yield unbiased estimates in the second   14
stage, possibly because newspapers are less constrained in the number of stories covered on any 
given day than is broadcast news.  Thus, the estimates which include instrumental variables will 
focus only television coverage of the tsunami.  
Table 5 describes the effect of television coverage of the tsunami disaster on private 
donations to relief agencies using IV tobit estimation to control for any extant simultaneity and 
omitted variable bias.   As above, private donations to relief agencies are expressed in terms of z-
scores and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported.  Column 1 presents results that 
employ daily television coverage of the Iraq war as the instrument and Column 2 presents results 
that use the number of U.S. military casualties in Iraq by day as the instrument.  The estimated 
effect of nightly news coverage is essentially unchanged from the tobit results without 
instrumentation presented in Table 1: an additional minute of television news coverage raises 
donations to relief agencies by between 0.036 and 0.038 standard deviations from the mean, or 
between 13.2% and 13.9%.  The estimates are significant at the 10% level when using U.S. 
military casualties in Iraq as the instrument and at the 1% level when using television coverage 
of the Iraq war as an instrument.  These results suggest that neither simultaneity bias nor omitted 
variable bias is a serious problem, and the subsequent results do not include instrumentation. 
Finally, Table 6 includes media-agency interaction terms to determine whether the 
marginal effect of media coverage differs for each relief agency using tobit estimation.  Again, 
private donations to relief agencies are expressed in terms of z-scores and heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are reported.  The estimated effect of television news coverage is not 
statistically different from zero for either Agency 1 or Agency 6 (Column 1), suggesting that 
variation in television coverage does not have any discernable effect on donations received 
during the study period.  By contrast, an additional minute of broadcast news coverage increases 
donations to Agency 2 by 0.056 standard deviations (P > χ
2 = 0.001), to Agency 3 by 0.082 
standard deviations (P > χ
2 = 0.000), to Agency 5 by 0.084 standard deviations (P > χ
2 = 0.000), 
to Agency 7 by 0.009 standard deviations (P > χ
2 = 0.038), and to Agency 8 by 0.048 standard 
deviations (P > χ
2 = 0.083).  Notably, additional television news reduces donations to Agency 4 
by 0.012 standard deviations (P > χ
2 = 0.089), suggesting that charitable giving may became 
more concentrated during the tsunami.  This may occur, for example, if television coverage 
induces donors who have given to Agency 4 previously to donate to another agency instead.   15
Similar results are found for newspaper coverage (Column 2).  The marginal effect of 
additional coverage of the tsunami in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal are to 
increase donations to Agency 2 by 0.010 standard deviations (P > χ
2 = 0.010), to Agency 3 by 
0.015 standard deviations (P > χ
2 = 0.000), to Agency 5 by 0.015 standard deviations (P > χ
2 = 
0.008), and Agency 8 by 0.011 standard deviations (P > χ
2 = 0.098).  The marginal effect of 
media coverage on donations to Agencies 1 and 6 is again statistically indistinguishable from 
zero, as is the effect of media coverage on donations to Agency 4.  Interestingly, newspaper 
coverage of the tsunami has the opposite effect of television coverage for Agency 7, with an 
additional 100 words reducing estimated donations by 0.003 standard deviations (P > χ
2 = 0.053), 
suggesting that the source of information is also important for some relief agencies. 
Together, these results show that both television and newspaper coverage of the 2004 
tsunami had a positive and significant effect on Internet donations to relief agencies.  However, 
the effect varies greatly by agency, and media coverage can lead to lower donations in some 
cases. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates the empirical relationship between media coverage of humanitarian crises 
and private donations to relief agencies.  The 2004 tsunami provides an excellent case study 
because it prompted unprecedented media coverage, unprecedented charitable giving, and a great 
deal of speculation about the relationship between the two.   
We assess the effects of tsunami-related reporting on ABC World News Tonight, the CBS 
Evening News, and NBC Nightly News and tsunami-related articles in the New York Times and 
the Wall Street Journal on donations to eight U.S. charities that provided services to victims of 
the tsunami.  Because Internet donations played an important role in facilitating giving after the 
tsunami, because they are more likely to reflect contemporaneous media coverage of the disaster, 
and because they are not subject to recall bias, we exclude other forms of giving in the analysis.  
We also control for donor fatigue via a variable measuring the number of days after the tsunami 
that donations were made, for tax incentives via a dummy indicating the last day that donations 
were eligible for 2004 deductions, and for agency-specific effects via a series of dummies.  
We find that an additional minute allocated to tsunami coverage on the evening news 
increases that day’s donations by 0.036 standard deviations from the mean, or 13.2% for the   16
average agency.  Similarly, 100 additional words allocated to tsunami coverage in major 
newspapers increase that day’s donations by 0.007 standard deviations from the mean, or 2.6% 
for the average agency; a typical 700-word article thus raises donations by 18.2% on average.   
Simultaneity concerns may arise due to media coverage of donors’ generosity.  Similarly, 
omitted variables such as news coverage of the tsunami in other media sources, advertising, and 
direct mail campaigns undertaken by relief agencies may bias the estimated effect of media 
coverage upward.  To account for this possibility, we employ two different instrumental 
variables – media coverage of the Iraq war and U.S. military casualties in Iraq.  These 
instruments are strong predictors of television news coverage while remaining plausibly 
exogenous to donations to relief agencies, yet instrumenting for media coverage of the tsunami 
does not appreciably affect the point estimates. 
Next, we find that the marginal effect of media coverage differs considerably among the 
eight agencies.  For example, an additional minute of tsunami coverage on the evening news 
increases donations by 0.084 standard deviations for one agency while 100 additional words of 
tsunami coverage in newspaper articles increases donations by 0.015 standard deviations.  By 
contrast, a different agency did not see any impact of news coverage on its Internet donations.  
Also, television coverage increased donations while newspaper coverage decreased donations for 
one agency, suggesting that the form of media coverage may also impact Internet donations for 
some charitable organizations. 
Finally, we find that donations decay over time, even controlling for media coverage of 
the tsunami, providing evidence of donor fatigue.  However, the Tsunami Disaster Aid Tax 
Relief Act, which extended tax deductions for tax year 2004 until 31 January 2005 for tsunami-
related charitable contributions, prolonged high levels of giving and contributed to record giving.  
This result provides further evidence that tax policy complements media coverage in inducing 
donations to charities. 
From the perspective of economic theory, U.S. residents donating to victims half a world 
away provides further evidence for Andreoni’s (1989, 1990) “warm glow” motivation for 
individual altruism.  Because most Internet donations are unheralded, it further appears that 
many donors to tsunami relief were neither motivated by conspicuous giving for socioeconomic 
recognition (Glazer and Konrad 1996) nor by opportunities to partake in “impact philanthropy”   17
(Duncan 2004).  Instead, people may have participated in charitable giving at these record levels 
precisely because so many others were also giving (Sugden, 1984). 
From a broader social perspective, our results clearly demonstrate the causal impact of 
media coverage of humanitarian crises on charitable giving.  This conclusion suggests that 
encouraging media to keep humanitarian crises in the news is in the best interest of relief 
agencies.  Media-savvy charities have certainly done so by making themselves available for 
updates long after disasters struck.  For example, relief workers from Oxfam provided 
commentary about tsunami clean-up on all three network evening news broadcasts at the end of 
March 2005.  Similarly, reconstruction efforts undertaken by Catholic Relief Services in Banda 
Aceh were featured in a three-minute segment on NBC Nightly News a year after the tsunami 
struck.  Indeed, some humanitarian agencies even create news, as did the International Rescue 
Committee in awarding its Freedom Award to Presidents Bush and Clinton for their efforts on 
behalf of tsunami victims, which pushed the tsunami back into the news in mid-November 2005.   
It is our hope that the television and newspaper media will also recognize this 
relationship and that the beneficiaries of relief agencies’ efforts will enter into their calculus 
when deciding which news stories to present.  In this way, celebrity trials may no longer push 
disasters out of the media spotlight.   18
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TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Unit  Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Total Internet 
Donations  # 714  $72,583.30 $265,802.00 $0.00  $3,145,853.00
Donations to Agency 1  #  101  $171.60 $556.96 $0.00  $5,000.00
Donations to Agency 2  #  101  $106,561.60 $287,211.00 $1,143.00 $1,968,930.00
Donations to Agency 3  #  101  $126,914.90 $357,153.40 $0.00 $2,004,113.00
Donations to Agency 4  #  71  $3,515.61 $12,530.91 $0.00 $98,346.22
Donations to Agency 5  #  98  $135,070.50 $389,883.50 $1,773.00 $2,896,813.00
Donations to Agency 6  #  101  $23,735.52 $59,864.76 $0.00 $392,857.60
Donations to Agency 7  #  71  $964.16 $1,660.80 $0.00  $9,560.00
Donations to Agency 8  #  70  $175,339.40 $403,689.70 $1,670.00 $3,145,853.00
ABC Daily Minutes  #  101  1.88 4.02 0.00  18.00
CBS Daily Minutes  #  101  1.52 3.17 0.00  12.67
NBC Daily Minutes  #  101  2.23 4.11 0.00  14.83
Total Daily TV Minutes  #  101  5.63 10.42 0.00  39.00
NYT Daily Word Count  #  101 1,791.85 2,745.96 0.00 15,132.00
WSJ Daily Word Count  #  73 2,356.27 3,644.75 0.00  14,888.00
Total Daily Word 
Count #  101  3,494.90 5,642.75 0.00  30,020.00
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TABLE 2 
Effect of Nightly News Coverage on Donations to Relief Agencies (z-scores) 
(Tobit) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Total  ABC  CBS  NBC 
Coverage on Nightly News (Minutes)  0.035*** 0.084*** 0.060*** 0.065*** 
  (5.32) (4.81) (3.49) (4.76) 
Log  Days  After  -0.351*** -0.412*** -0.531*** -0.450*** 
  (4.15) (5.03) (5.62) (4.81) 
Dummy for 31 January  0.659***  0.616***  0.555***  0.601*** 
  (3.05) (2.87) (2.58) (2.82) 
Agency  2  1.143*** 1.140*** 1.167*** 1.161*** 
  (6.56) (6.54) (6.64) (6.58) 
Agency  3  1.106*** 1.103*** 1.122*** 1.118*** 
  (6.00) (6.01) (6.00) (5.98) 
Agency  4  0.210 0.198 0.210 0.235 
  (1.38) (1.30) (1.45) (1.60) 
Agency  5  1.266*** 1.264*** 1.293*** 1.285*** 
  (5.84) (5.84) (5.86) (5.85) 
Agency  6  0.778*** 0.775*** 0.800*** 0.794*** 
  (5.17) (5.13) (5.38) (5.30) 
Agency  7  1.024*** 1.011*** 1.039*** 1.041*** 
  (5.84) (5.80) (5.91) (5.90) 
Agency  8  1.360*** 1.351*** 1.383*** 1.396*** 
  (5.45) (5.41) (5.53) (5.54) 
Constant  0.027 0.296 0.761**  0.423 
    (0.09) (1.12) (2.55) (1.39) 
Observations  709 709 709 709 
Censored  Observations  118     
      
NOTE: Absolute value of robust z-statistics  in  parentheses.    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
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 TABLE 3 
Effect of Newspaper Coverage on Donations to Relief Agencies (z-scores) 
(Tobit) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
   Total  NYT  WSJ 
Newspaper Word Count (100 Words)  0.0071*** 0.0096***  0.0138*** 
  (3.61) (3.05) (3.71) 
Log Days After  -0.353***  -0.493***  -0.321*** 
  (4.11) (5.30) (3.06) 
Dummy for 31 January  0.674***  0.565***  0.773*** 
  (3.00) (2.62) (3.23) 
Agency  2  1.166*** 1.184*** 1.331*** 
  (6.81) (6.73) (6.48) 
Agency  3  1.126*** 1.137*** 1.327*** 
  (6.12) (6.06) (5.84) 
Agency 4  0.183  0.236*  0.285 
  (1.21) (1.65) (1.62) 
Agency  5  1.281*** 1.302*** 1.453*** 
  (6.08) (6.00) (5.64) 
Agency  6  0.802*** 0.817*** 0.889*** 
  (5.40) (5.48) (4.99) 
Agency  7  1.064*** 1.081*** 1.210*** 
  (6.05) (6.00) (5.80) 
Agency  8  1.359*** 1.420*** 1.496*** 
  (5.82) (5.76) (5.78) 
Constant -0.045  0.522  -0.336 
    (0.12) (1.51) (0.73) 
Observations  709 709 554 
Censored Observations  118     
     
NOTE: Absolute value of robust z-statistics in 
parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%    
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TABLE 4 
Effect of Iraq News Coverage and U.S. Military Casualties  
on Tsunami Coverage During Evening News Broadcasts 
(First Stage of IV Tobit) 
 (1)  (2) 
  
Iraq News 
Coverage 
US Military 
Casualties 
Coverage on Nightly News (Minutes)  -0.286***  -0.191*** 
 (19.10)  (6.12) 
Log Days After  -9.302***  -9.264*** 
 (34.22)  (31.82) 
Dummy for 31 January  2.396***  -5.682*** 
 (5.27)  (22.77) 
Agency 2  0.000  0.000 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
Agency 3  0.000  0.000 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
Agency 4  0.340  0.391 
 (0.40)  (0.43) 
Agency 5  0.091  0.083 
 (0.12)  (0.10) 
Agency 6  0.000  0.000 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
Agency 7  -0.350  -0.524 
 (0.50)  (0.70) 
Agency 8  0.340  0.391 
 (0.40)  (0.43) 
Constant 41.643***  39.597*** 
   (34.01)  (30.75) 
Observations 800  800 
Censored Observations  440   
    
NOTE: Absolute value of robust z-statistics in 
parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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TABLE 5 
Effect of Television Coverage on Donations to Relief Agencies (z-scores)  
with Instrumental Variables 
(Second Stage of IV Tobit) 
 (1)  (2) 
  
Iraq News 
Coverage 
US Military 
Casualties 
Coverage on Nightly News (Minutes)  0.038***  0.036* 
 (3.32)  (1.65) 
Log Days After  -0.311***  -0.333* 
 (4.75)  (1.95) 
Dummy for 31 January  0.646***  0.632*** 
 (2.94)  (2.58) 
Agency 2  1.035***  1.035*** 
 (6.04)  (6.02) 
Agency 3  1.031***  1.032*** 
 (5.68)  (5.67) 
Agency 4  0.186  0.186 
 (1.25)  (1.27) 
Agency 5  1.158***  1.158*** 
 (5.42)  5.40   
Agency 6  0.681***  0.681*** 
 (4.61)  4.61   
Agency 7  0.916***  0.915*** 
 (5.26)  5.21   
Agency 8  1.251***  1.253*** 
 (5.12)  5.11   
Constant -0.024  0.069 
   (0.08)  (0.09) 
Observations 709  709 
Censored Observations  118   
    
NOTE: Absolute value of robust z-statistics in 
parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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TABLE 6 
Effect of Media Coverage on Donations to Each Relief Agency (z-scores) 
(Tobit) 
 (1)  (2) 
   Television  Newspaper 
Media Coverage (Minutes or Word Counts)  -0.0055  0.00060 
 (0.87)  (0.56) 
Log Days After  -0.3133***  -0.3255*** 
 (3.99)  (4.03) 
Dummy for 31 January  0.6149***  0.6253*** 
 (2.74)  (2.64) 
Agency 2  0.6274***  0.6572*** 
 (4.79)  (4.67) 
Agency 3  0.4519***  0.4589*** 
 (3.82)  (3.39) 
Agency 4  0.2236**  0.2376** 
 (2.24)  (2.14) 
Agency 5  0.6087***  0.6090*** 
 (4.81)  (4.25) 
Agency 6  0.6057***  0.6701*** 
 (4.83)  (5.39) 
Agency 7  0.6343***  0.7525*** 
 (4.91)  (5.83) 
Agency 8  0.8840***  0.7834*** 
 (7.12)  (5.19) 
Media Coverage*Agency 2  0.0616***  0.0092** 
 (3.56)  (2.56) 
Media Coverage*Agency 3  0.0878***  0.0137*** 
 (4.25)  (3.62) 
Media Coverage*Agency 4  -0.0068  -0.0012 
 (0.93)  (1.39) 
Media Coverage*Agency 5  0.0896***  0.0138*** 
 (3.63)  (2.68) 
Media Coverage*Agency 6  0.0005  -0.0012 
 (0.08)  (1.14) 
Media Coverage*Agency 7  0.0147*  -0.0036** 
 (1.77)  (2.42) 
Media Coverage*Agency 8  0.0531*  0.0104* 
 (1.89)  (1.69) 
Constant 0.2931  0.2621 
   (1.04)  (0.81) 
Observations 709  709 
Censored Observations  118   
    
NOTE: Absolute value of robust z-statistics in 
parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     27
FIGURE 1 
Donations and Television Coverage from Day 0 to Day 21 
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FIGURE 2 
Donations and Television Coverage from Day 21 to Day 100 
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FIGURE 3 
Newspaper and Television Coverage from Day 0 to Day 100 
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Media Coverage and Charitable Giving After the 2004 Tsunami 
Philip H. Brown & Jessica H. Minty 
 
Executive Summary 
 
This paper investigates the empirical relationship between media coverage of humanitarian crises 
and private donations to relief agencies.  The 2004 tsunami provides an excellent case study 
because it prompted unprecedented media coverage of a humanitarian crisis, unprecedented 
charitable giving to relief agencies, and a great deal of speculation about the relationship 
between the two.   
 
We assess the effects of tsunami-related reporting on the three network nightly news broadcasts 
and tsunami-related articles in two major newspapers on donations to eight U.S. charities that 
provided services to tsunami victims.  We focus on donations made via the Internet in particular 
to minimize time lags between media coverage and the receipt of a donation.  In order to make 
meaningful comparisons across all 8 agencies, we convert each day’s donations to deviations 
from the mean daily donation.  To better isolate the effect of media coverage, our analysis 
controls for the passage of time and for tax incentives for making charitable donations.  We find: 
 
  Media coverage of the tsunami clearly affected donations to relief agencies, even controlling 
for the passage of time and tax incentives.  One additional minute of tsunami coverage on the 
evening news increases donations on that day by 0.036 standard deviations from the mean, or 
13.2% for the average agency.   
 
  One hundred additional words allocated to tsunami coverage in major newspapers increase 
that day’s donations by 0.007 standard deviations from the mean, or 2.6% for the average 
agency; a typical 700-word article thus raises donations by 18.2% on average. 
 
  Donations decline over time, providing evidence of donor fatigue.  By contrast, the Tsunami 
Disaster Aid Tax Relief Act prolonged high levels of giving and contributed to record giving. 
   
Unfortunately, these results are subject to two important statistical limitations.  First, while we 
account for time and tax incentives, we are unable to control for other aspects of charitable 
giving such as direct mail campaigns, advertising, and news coverage in other media.  Second, 
the unprecedented giving occasionally became news itself, raising questions about the direction 
of causality between media coverage and charitable giving.  To account for these possibilities, 
we employ an econometric method known as instrumental variables.  In doing so, we find: 
 
  Correcting for these statistical limitations does not affect the estimated effect of media 
coverage on charitable giving, i.e., the main results are extremely robust. 
 
Finally, we consider the possibility that the effect of media coverage on charitable giving is not 
uniform across relief agencies.  We find:  
 
  While giving to most of the charities included in the study increases with media coverage, 
donations to some agencies were not impacted by media coverage. 
 
These results clearly demonstrate the large, causal, impact of media coverage of humanitarian 
crises on charitable giving to the majority of relief agencies.  We hope that this finding will enter 
the calculus of news media when deciding which stories to present.    
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